Introduction
The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] specification defines cryptographic message encodings using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049] . This specification defines algorithm encodings and representations enabling RSA algorithms to be used for COSE messages.
Requirements Notation and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] .
RSASSA-PSS Signature Algorithm
The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is defined in [RFC3447] .
The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is parameterized with a hash function (h), a mask generation function (mgf) and a salt length (sLen). For this specification, the mask generation function is fixed to be MGF1 as defined in [RFC3447] that the same hash function be used for hashing the data as well as in the mask generation function. This specification follows this recommendation. The salt length is the same length as the hash function output.
Implementations need to check that the key type is 'RSA' when creating or verifying a signature.
The algorithms defined in this document can be found in Table 1 . [RFC3447] . The algorithm is parameterized using a masking generation function (mgf), a hash function (h) and encoding parameters (P). For the algorithm identifiers defined in this section: o mgf is always set to MFG1 from [RFC3447] and uses the same hash function as h.
o P is always set to the empty octet string. Table 2 summarizes the rest of the values. The key type MUST be 'RSA'.
RSA Keys
Key types are identified by the 'kty' member of the COSE_Key object. This specification defines one value for this member. This document defines a key structure for both the public and private parts of RSA keys. Together, an RSA public key and an RSA private key form an RSA key pair.
The document also provides support for the so-called "multi-prime" RSA keys, in which the modulus may have more than two prime factors. The benefit of multi-prime RSA is lower computational cost for the decryption and signature primitives. For a discussion on how multiprime affects the security of RSA crypto-systems, the reader is referred to [MultiPrimeRSA] .
This document follows the naming convention of [RFC3447] for the naming of the fields of an RSA public or private key. Table 4 provides a summary of the label values and the types associated with each of those labels. The requirements for fields for RSA keys are as follows:
o For all keys, 'kty' MUST be present and MUST have a value of 3. o For public keys, the fields 'n' and 'e' MUST be present. All other fields defined in Table 4 MUST be absent.
o For private keys with two primes, the fields 'other', 'r_i', 'd_i' and 't_i' MUST be absent; all other fields MUST be present.
o For private keys with more than two primes, all fields MUST be present. For the third to nth primes, each of the primes is represented as a map containing the fields 'r_i', 'd_i' and 't_i'. The field 'other' is an array of those maps.
o All numeric key parameters are encoded in an unsigned big-endian representation as an octet sequence using the CBOR byte string type (major type 2). The values in Table 1 and Table 2 are to be added to the registry.
COSE Key Type Registry
This section registers values in the IANA "COSE Key Type" registry [IANA.COSE].
The values in Table 3 are to be added to the registry.
COSE Key Type Parameters Registry
This section registers values in the IANA "COSE Key Type Parameters" registry [IANA.COSE].
The values in Table 4 are to be added to the registry. 6. Security Considerations
Key Size Security Considerations
A key size of 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms. This key size corresponds roughly to the same strength as provided by a 128-bit symmetric encryption algorithm. Implementations SHOULD be able to encrypt and decrypt with modulus between 2048 and 16K bits in length. Applications can impose additional restrictions on the length of the modulus.
In addition to needing to worry about keys that are too small to provide the required security, there are issues with keys that are too large. Denial of service attacks have been mounted with overly large keys or oddly sized keys. This has the potential to consume resources with these keys. It is highly recommended that checks on the key length be done before starting a cryptographic operation.
There are two reasonable ways to address this attack. First, a key should not be used for a cryptographic operation until it has been verified that it is controlled by a legitimate participant. This approach means that no cryptography would be done except with keys of legitimate parties. Second, applications can impose maximum as well as minimum length requirements on keys. This limits the resources that would otherwise be consumed by the use of overly large keys.
RSASSA-PSS Security Considerations
There is a theoretical hash substitution attack that can be mounted against RSASSA-PSS. However, the requirement that the same hash function be used consistently for all operations is an effective mitigation against it. Unlike ECDSA, hash function outputs are not truncated so that the full hash value is always signed. The internal padding structure of RSASSA-PSS means that one needs to have multiple collisions between the two hash functions to be successful in producing a forgery based on changing the hash function. This is highly unlikely.
RSAES-OAEP Security Considerations
A version of RSAES-OAEP using the default parameters specified in Appendix A. o Revised the algorithm assignments based on those in draft-ietfcose-msg-24.
-00 o This specification addresses COSE issue #21: Restore RSA-PSS and the "RSA" key type. The initial version of this specification incorporates text from draft-ietf-cose-msg-05 --the last COSE message specification version before the RSA algorithms were removed.
